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Approximate Solutions of the Walrasian Equilibrium







Recently Cherchye et al. (2011) reformulated the Walrasian equilibrium in-
equalities, introduced by Brown and Matzkin (1996), as an integer programming
problem and proved that solving the Walrasian equilibrium inequalities is NP-
hard. Brown and Shannon (2002) derived an equivalent system of equilibrium
inequalities ,i.e., the dual Walrasian equilibrium inequalities. That is, the Wal-
rasian equilibrium inequalities are solvable iff the dual Walrasian equilibrium
inequalities are solvable.
We show that solving the dual Walrsian equilibrium inequalities is equivalent
to solving a NP-hard minimization problem. Approximation theorems are poly-
nomial time algorithms for computing approximate solutions of NP-hard mini-
mization problems. The primary contribution of this paper is an approximation
theorem for the equivalent NP-hard minimization problem. In this theorem,
we derive explicit bounds, where the degree of approximation is determined by
observable market data.
Keywords: Rationalizable Walrasian markets, NP-hard minimization problems,
Approximation theorems
JEL Classification: B41, C68, D46
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1 Introduction
The Brown-Matzkin (1996) theory of rationalizing market data with Walrasian mar-
kets, where consumers are price-taking, utility maximizers subject to budget con-
straints, consists of market data sets and the Walrasian equilibrium inequalities. A
market data set is a finite number of observations on market prices, income dis-
tributions and social endowments. The Walrasian equilibrium inequalities are the
Afriat inequalities for each consumer—see Afriat (1967) and Varian (1982); the budget
constraints for each consumer and the market clearing conditions in each observa-
tion. The unknowns in the Walrasian equilibrium inequalities are the utility levels,
the marginal utilities of income and the Marshallian demands of individual con-
sumers in each observation. The parameters are the observable market data: market
prices, income distributions and social endowments in each observation. The Wal-
rasian equilibrium inequalities are said to rationalize the observable market data if
the Walrasian equilibrium inequalities are solvable for some family of utility levels,
marginal utilities of income and Marshallian demands of individual consumers, where
aggregate Marshallian demands are equal to the social endowments in every obser-
vation. Brown and Matzkin show that the observed market data is consistent with
the Walrasian paradigm, as articulated by Arrow and Debreu (1954), iff the Wal-
rasian equilibrium inequalities rationalize the observed market data. As such, the
Brown—Matzkin theory of rationalizing market data with Walrasian markets requires
an effi cient algorithm for solving the Walrasian equilibrium inequalities.
The Walrasian equilibrium inequalities are multivariate polynomial inequalities.
The Tarski—Seidenberg theorem, Tarski (1951), provides an algorithm, “quantifier
elimination,”that derives a finite family of multivariate polynomial inequalities, i.e.,
the “revealed Walrasian equilibrium inequalities”from the Walrasian equilibrium in-
equalities, where the unknowns are the observable market data: market prices, in-
come distributions and the social endowments in each observation. It follows from the
Tarski—Seidenberg theorem that the revealed Walrasian equilibrium inequalities are
solvable for the observed market data iff the Walrasian equilibrium inequalities are
solvable for some family of utility levels, marginal utilities of income and Marshallian
demands of consumers.
An important example is the special case of the Walrasian equilibrium inequalities,
recently introduced by Brown and Calsamiglia (2014). They propose necessary and
suffi cient conditions on observable market data to rationalize the market data with
consumers endowed with utility functions, where the marginal utilities of income
are constant: the so-called "strong law of demand". The strong law of demand is
a finite family of linear inequalities on the observed market data, hence solvable in
polynomial time. See their paper for details.
Unfortunately, in general, the computational complexity of the Tarski—Seidenberg
algorithm, is known to be doubly exponential in the worse case. Hence we are forced
to consider approximate solutions of the Walrasian equilibrium inequalities. See
Basu (2011) for a discussion of the Tarski—Seidenberg theorem and the computational
complexity of quantifier elimination.
A decision problem in computer science is a problem where the answer is “yes”
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or “no.” In this paper, the decision problem is: Can the observed market data be
rationalized with Walrasian equilibrium inequalities? That is, are the Walrasian
equilibrium inequalities solvable if the values of the parameters are derived from the
observed market data? A decision problem is said to have polynomial complexity,
i.e., the problem is in class P , if there exists an algorithm that solves each instance
of the problem in time that is polynomial in some measure of the size of the problem
instance. In the literature on computational complexity, polynomial time algorithms
are referred to as “effi cient”algorithms. A decision problem is said to be in NP , if
there exists an algorithm that verifies, in polynomial time, if a proposal is a solution
of the problem instance Clearly, P ⊂ NP but it is widely conjectured by computer
scientists that P 6= NP . The decision problem A is said to be NP -hard, if every
problem in NP can be reduced in polynomial time to A. That is, if we can decide the
NP -hard problem A in polynomial time then we can decide every NP problem in
polynomial time. In this case, contrary to the current beliefs of computer scientists,
P = NP.
What is the computational complexity of solving the Walrasian equilibrium in-
equalities? This important question was first addressed by Cherchye et al. (2011).
They proved that solving the Walrasian equilibrium inequalities, reformulated as an
integer programming problem, is NP -hard. We show that approximate solutions
of the Walrasian equilibrium inequalities, reformulated as the dual Walrasian equi-
librium inequalities introduced by Shannon and Brown (2000), can be computed in
polynomial time. In the Brown-Shannon theory of rationalizing market data with
Walrasian markets, the Afriat inequalities are replaced by the dual Afriat inequali-
ties for minimizing the consumer’s monotone, strictly convex, indirect utility function
over prices subject to her budget constraint, defined by her Marshallian demand at
the equilibrium market prices. The dual Walrasian equilibrium inequalities are said
to rationalize the observed market data if the inequalities are solvable for some fam-
ily of indirect utility levels, marginal indirect utilities and Marshallian demands of
individual consumers, derived from Roy’s identity, where the aggregate Marshallian
demands are equal to the social endowment in every observation.
Brown and Shannon proved that the Walrasian equilibrium inequalities are solv-
able iff the dual Walrasian equilibrium inequalities are solvable. We show that solving
the dual Walrasian equilibrium inequalities is equivalent to solving a NP−hard mini-
mization problem. Approximation theorems are polynomial time algorithms for com-
puting approximate solutions of a NP −hard minimization problem, where there are
explicit a priori bounds on the degree of approximation. The primary contribution of
this paper is an approximation theorem for a NP -hard minimization problem equiv-
alent to solving Walrasian equilibrium inequalities with uniformly bounded marginal
utilities of income.
2 The Dual Walrasian Equilibrium Inequalities
In this section, following the suggestions of the referees on notation and
exposition, we review and summarize the dual Walrasian equilibrium inequali-
3
ties proposed by Brown and Shannon. We consider an exchange economy, with
i ∈ {1, 2, ...,M} consumers. For each observation j ∈ {1, 2, ..., N}, pj is a vector of
prices in RL++ , ηj is a vector of aggregate endowments of commodities in R
L
++ and
{I1,j , I2,j , ..., IM,j} is the distribution of positive incomes of consumers in observa-
tion j, where
∑i=M
i=1 Ii,j = pj · ηj for j = 1, 2, .., N . Brown and Shannon show that
there exist strictly convex indirect utility functions Vi(
p
I ) for the i
th consumer and
Marshallian demand vectors xij ∈ RL++ for the ith consumer in the jth observation
that constitute a competitive equlibrium in the jth observation with respect to the
observed data iff there exists numbers Vi,j and λi,j > 0 and vectors qi,j << 0 such
that Eqs. (1) and (2) hold:

















for all i ∈ {1, 2, ...,M} and for all j, k ∈ {1, 2, ..., N}, j 6= k.
To derive the explicit expression of the marginal utilities of income in Eq. 3, we
consider the dual optimization problem of a consumer in an exchange economy, where
she minimizes a monotone, smooth, strictly convex indirect utility function subject
to her budget constraint. The budget constraint is defined by her income and her
Marshallian demand, given by her income and market prices. That is, for fixed
(pj , Ii,j), the ith consumer in observation j, solves the primal concave maximization
problem (Pi,j) :
max
{x∈RL++: p·x ≤ Ii,j}
Ui(x) = Ui(xi,j)
, where xi,j is the Marshallian demand at (pj , Ii,j). In the dual problem for fixed
(xi,j , Ii,j) the consumer solves the dual convex minimization problem (Di,j) :
min




















It follows from Slater’s constraint qualification that there exist µi,j ≥ 0 such that the







· xi,j − 1)
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As noted by the referees, the intuition of this specification is immediate: Vi,j is
the ith consumer’s utility of xi,j in observation j; λi,j is her marginal utility of income
in observation j; qi,j is the gradient of her indirect utility function with respect to
1
Ii,j
pj in observation j; Eq. (1) is the dual Afriat inequalities for minimizing her
strictly convex, indirect utility function subject to her budget constraint in each
observation; Eq. (3) is the first order conditions of consumer i in observation j
for minimizing her strictly convex, indirect utility function subject to her budget
constraint and Eq.(2) are the market clearing conditions in observation j.
The system of inequalities defined by Eqs. (1) and (3) are linear in the un-
known utility levels Vi,j , marginal utilities of income λi,j and marginal indirect utili-
ties qi,j .Unfortunately, Eq. (2) is nonlinear in λi,j and qi,j .In fact, this nonlinearity
is the cause of the NP − hard computational complexity first observed by Cherchye
et al.
3 Bounds on the Marginal Utilities of Income
There is a special case of the dual Walrasian equilibrium inequalities where the com-
putational complexity is polynomial. If we restrict attention to exchange economies
where λi,j is 1 for all i and j, as in Brown and Calsamiglia, then Eqs. (2) and (3)





qi,j ≤ ηj andλi,j =
pj ·−qi,j
I2i,j
= 1 In this
case, the dual Walrasian equilibrium inequalities : Eqs. (1), (2) and (3), are linear
inequalities in the unknowns Ω ≡ {(Vi,j , qi,j) : Eq. (1) holds and i = 1, 2, ...,M ;
j = 1, 2, ..., N}. Hence solvable in polynomial time.
































ΘW ≥ max{1;λij(ω) : 1 ≤ i ≤M ; 1 ≤ j ≤ N ;ω ∈ Ω}
Proof.































} ≡ ΘW Upper Bound
We now have a uniform upper bound on the marginal utilities of income, where
λi,j = 1 is feasible. That is, 1 ≤ ΘW and for 1 ≤ i ≤ N and 1 ≤ j ≤M : λi,j ≤ ΘW .
4 Approximation Theorem
Definition 2 An approximation theorem for a NP − hard minimization problem,
with optimal value OPT (β) for each input β, is a polynomial time algorithm for
computing ̂OPT (β), the optimal value of the approximating minimization problem
for the input β, and the approximation ratio α(β) ≥ 1, where




≤ OPT (β) ≤ ̂OPT (β)
This definition was taken from the survey paper by Arora (1998) on the theory and
application of approximation theorems in combinatorial optimization.
Theorem 3 If Θ ≥ ΘW and ∆W is the optimal value of the nonconvex program SW ,
where












qi,j ≤ sjηj for 1 ≤ j ≤ N} : SW
ΓW is the optimal value of the approximating linear program R,where












qi,j ≤ rjηj for 1 ≤ j ≤ N} : RW
ΨW is the optimal value of the nonconvex program T , where












qij ≤ tjηj for 1 ≤ j ≤ N} : TW
6
then
(8) ΨW ≥ ΓW ≥ ∆W
and
(9) ΨW = Θ∆W
Hence
(10) Θ∆W ≥ ΓW ≥ ∆W ⇐⇒ ΓW ≥ ∆W ≥
ΓW
Θ
, where Θ is the the approximation rato.
Proof. (i) If rj is feasible in RW , then rj is feasible in SW and if tj is feasible in T









































ΘW∆W ≥ ΓW ≥ ∆W ⇐⇒ ΓW ≥ ∆W ≥
ΓW
ΘW
Corollary 5 (a) ΨW = 1, iff the Walrasian equilibrium inequalities with constant
marginal utilities of income rationalize the observed market data. (b) It follows from
the Brown and Calsamiglia paper that ΨW = 1 iff the observed market data satisfies
the strong law of demand. (c) If ΨW = 1 then ∆W = 1. (d) ∆W = 1, iff the
Walrasian equilibrium inequalities with uniformly bounded marginal utilities of income
rationalize the observed market data
5 The Gorman Polar Form Equilibrium Inequalities
In Gorman’s seminal (1961) paper, representative agent eonomies are characterized
as exchange economies, where each consumer’s indirect utility function Vi(p, I) can
be expressed as Vi(p, I) =
I−ai(p)
b(p) where ai(p) and b(p) are concave and homogeneous
of degree 1. Hence all consumers have the same marginal utility of income, 1b(p) .
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The Vi(p, I) are quasiconvex in p, but we make the stronger assumption that they
are convex in p. As suggested by Varian(1992) in section 9.4, where he implicitly
uses well known results in fractional programming on ratios of convex and concave
functions, we express utility functions in Gorman polar form as follows:
(G) If Vi(p, I) =
I − ai(p)
b(p)
, then Vi(p, I) = Ie(p) + fi(p),





are convex in p































ΘG ≥ max{1;λj(ω) : 1 ≤ i ≤M ; 1 ≤ j ≤ N ;ω ∈ Ω}
Proof.































} ≡ ΘG Upper Bound
We now have a uniform upper bound on the marginal utilities of income, where
λ,j = 1 is feasible. That is, 1 ≤ ΘG and for 1 ≤ i ≤ N and 1 ≤ j ≤M : λ,j ≤ ΘG.
Theorem 7 The Gorman Polar Form Equilibrium Inequalities:Eqs. (11), (12),
(13), (14) and (G1), (G2), (G3), (G4) (G5) are necessary and suffi cient con-
ditions for rationalizing the observed market data with an exchange economy where
consumers are endowed with Gorman polar form utility functions.

































} ≡ ΘG Upper Bound
If ei(p) and fi(p) are smooth and strictly convex, then for k 6= j and for 1 ≤ i ≤ N
and 1 ≤ j ≤M :
(G1) e(pk) > e(pj) +∇pe(pj) · (pk − pj)
(G2) fi(pk) > fi(pj) +∇pfi(pj) · (pk − pj)
(G3) Vi,j = Ii,je(pj) + fi(pj)
(G4) di,j = Ii,j∇pe(pj) +∇pfi(pj)
(G5) λj = e(pj)
Proof. Necessity is obvious. To prove suffi ciency, we use Afriat’s construction to
derive piecewise linear convex indirect utility functions Vi(p, I) satisfying Eqs.11,
13, 14 and piecewise linear convex functions: e(p) and fi(p) satisfying Eqs.G1 to
G5. That is, if zi − zj ≥ ∇azj · (ai − aj) for 1 ≤ i, j ≤ L is solvable for zl and
∇zl ∈ RS++, where al ∈ RS++, then z(a) ≡ max
j=L
j=1 {zj + zj · (a − aj)} is a piecewise
linear convex function. See Theorem 2.49 in Rockfellar and Wets (1998). ∂z(a) =
convex hull{∇a[zk+zk · (a−ak) : z(a) = [zk+zk · (a−ak)} is the subdifferential at a,
i.e., the set of subgradients of z at point a. See Exercise 8.31 in Rockafellar and Wets.
If Wi(p, I) ≡ Ie(p) + fi(p), then Vi(p, I) and Wi(p, I) have the same subdifferential
. As is well known, convex functions with the same subdifferential differ by at most
a constant. See Theorem 24.9 in Rockfellar (1970). Hence, Vi(p, I) = Wi(p, I) +Ki.
That is, Vi(p, I) and Wi(p, I) define the same family of indifference curves.
We now prove an approximation theorem for the Gorman Polar Form Equilibrium
Inequalities.
Theorem 8 If Θ ≥ ΘG and ∆G is the optimal value of the nonconvex program SG,
where














di,j ≤ sjηj for 1 ≤ j ≤ N} : SG
ΓG is the optimal value of the approximating linear program RG,where












di,j ≤ rjηj for 1 ≤ j ≤ N} : RG
ΨG is the optimal value of the nonconvex program TG, where














di,j ≤ tjηj for 1 ≤ j ≤ N} : TG
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then
(18) ΨG ≥ ΓG ≥ ∆G
and
(19) ΨG = Θ∆G
Hence
(20) Θ∆G ≥ ΓG ≥ ∆G ⇐⇒ ΓG ≥ ∆G ≥
ΓG
Θ
Proof. See the proof of Theorem 3.
Corollary 9
ΘG∆G ≥ ΓG ≥ ∆G ⇐⇒ ΓG ≥ ∆G ≥
ΓG
ΘG
Corollary 10 (a) ΨG = 1, iff the Gorman Polar Form equilibrium inequalities with
constant marginal utilities of income rationalize the observed market data. (b) It
follows from the Brown and Calsamiglia paper that ΨG = 1 iff the observed market
data satisfies the strong law of demand. (c) If ΨG = 1 then ∆G = 1. (d) ∆G = 1,
iff the Gorman Polar Form equilibrium inequalities with uniformly bounded marginal
utilities of income rationalize the observed market data.
6 Discussion
In this final section of the paper, we wish to describe our contribution to the growing
literature on Algorithmic Game Theory (AGT) or more precisely to the literature
on Algorithmic General Equilibrium (AGE) that predates AGT. AGE begins with
Scarf’s seminal (1967) article on computing approximate fixed points, followed by his
classic (1973) monograph: The Computation of Economic Equilibria.
Codenotti and Varadarajan (2007) review the literature on polynomial time algo-
rithms for computing competitive equilibria of restricted classes of exchange economies,
where the set of competitive equilibria is a convex set. It is the convexity of the equi-
librium set that allows the use of algorithms devised for solving convex programs.
These specifications are inspired by models of exchange proposed by Fisher (1891)
—see Brainard and Scarf (2000) —and Eisenberg (1961). In general, i.e., exchange
economies with nonconvex sets of competitive equilibria, the authors conclude that
the computational complexity of these models is unlikely to be polynomial, even in
the special case where consumers are endowed with Leontief utility functions.
In their recent (2009) survey of the computational complexity of fixed point meth-
ods and their application to general equilibrium price adjustment mechanisms, Pa-
padimitriou and Yannakakis show: Price adjusment mechanisms that find prices
which approximately clear the market, cannot converge in time less than exponential
in the number of goods. It is important to note that Scarf’s algorithm is not a price
adjustment mechanism, as defined in their paper. For economists, the analysis in
this paper is an exploration of the complexity of Smale’s (1976) price adjustment
mechanism.
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Scarf never explicitly addressed the issue of the computational complexity of,
what is now called, the Scarf algorithm, nor did his graduate students. His primary
research agenda was the computation of economic equilibria in real world economies.
This project is best illustrated in the (1992) monograph of Shoven and Whalley,
two of Scarf’s graduate students, who coined the phrase: Applied General Equilib-
rium, but following the recent literature, we will call this class of general equilibrium
models:Computable general equilibrium models (CGE) models There are now sev-
eral dozen CGE models used by policy makers around the world for estimating the
economic impact of proposed taxes, quotas, tariffs, price controls, changes in social
insurance, global warming, agricultural subsidies, ... These models are now the pri-
mary tools for counterfactual economic policy analysis. See the (2012) Handbook of
Computable General Equilibrium Modeling edited by Dixon and Jorgenson.
CGE models use parametric specifications of utility functions and cost func-
tions.The parameters are often estimated using a method called "calibration". That
is, choosing parameter values such that the CGE model replicates the observed equi-
librium prices and observed market demands in a single bench mark data set. As
you might expect there is some debate about the effi cacy of this methodology among
academic economists. In response to the obvious limitations of calibration and para-
metric specification, the Walrasian equilibrium inequalities were proposed by Brown
and Matzkin as a methodology for nonparametric estimation of CGE models using
several bench mark data sets. They proposed to extend the revealed preference analy-
sis of individual consumer demand introduced by Samuleson (1937) i.e., the Weak
Axiom of Revealed Preference, to rationalize the aggregate market data in each of
the several bench mark data sets: market prices, income distributions and social
endowments., by proposing necessary and suffi cient conditions for the existence of
consumers who maximize utility subject to budget constraints defined by the market
prices and the income distributions in each benchmark data set such that aggre-
gate consumer demand is equal to the social endowment. That is, revealed general
equilibrium (RGE).
Brown and Kannan (2008) initiated the complexity analysis of searching for solu-
tions of the Walrasian equilibrium inequalities. Subsequently, Cherchye et al (2011)
showed that the search problem for solving the Walrasian equilibrium inequalities,
formulated as an integer programming problem, is NP-complete. Unlike the computa-
tion of approximate fixed points or the equivalent problem of computing approximate
economic equilibria, the search problem for the Walrasian equilibrium inequalities has
a natural formulation within the literature on computational complexity, as demon-
strated by Cherchye et al.
Hence, AGE consists of two computable classes of general equilibrium models :
The parametric CGE models of Scarf-Shoven-Whalley and the nonparametric RGE
models of Brown-Matzkin-Shannon. Both classes of models admit counterfactual
policy analysis. The Lee-Brown (2007) model of monopoly pricing is an example of
RGE counterfactual analysis. In general, both classes of models lack the polynomial
time algorithms necessary for effi cient solution, hence they require approximation
theorems to carry out effective counterfactual policy analysis. Both classes of models
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contain special cases solvable in polynomial time. In the CGE models, homothetic
exchange economies satisfying the assumptions of Eisenberg’s (1961) aggregation the-
orem are solvable in polynomial time, using algorithmns from convex programming.
In the RGE models, the equilibrium inequalities for quasilinear exchange economies
are linear, hence solvable in polynomial time, using interior point methods from linear
programming. See Brown and Calsamiglia (2014).
We have presented two families of equilibrium inequalities as possible rationaliza-
tions of the observed market data. In each instance, we derived an approximation
theorem, where consumers in the approximating exchange economies are endowed
with quasilinear utilities. To test the null hypotheses that the observed market data is
rationalized by the Walrasian equilibrium inequalities or rationalized by the Gorman
Polar Form equilibrium inequalities, we compute the "confidence intervals" [ΓG− ΓGΘG ]




and ∆G ∈ [ΓG − ΓGΘG ].
If the null hypothesis, HW,0: the Walrasian equilibrium inequalities with marginal
utilities of income uniformly bounded by ΘW rationalizes the observed data set,
then the null hypothesis is rejected if 1 /∈ [Γw − ΓWΘW ]and we accept the alternative
hypothesis, HW,A: the Walrasian equilibrium inequalities with marginal utilities of
income uniformly bounded by ΘW is refuted for the observed data set. Similarly,
if the null hypothesis, HG,0 : the Gorman Polar Form equilibrium inequalities with
marginal utilities of income uniformly bounded by ΘG rationalizes the observed data
set, then the null hypothesis is rejected if 1 /∈ [ΓG− ΓGΘG ]and we accept the alternative
hypothesis, HG,A: the Gorman Polar Form equilibrium inequalities with marginal
utilities of income uniformly bounded by ΘW is refuted for the observed data set.
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